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Abstract 
The paper refers to the ongoing discussion on the current societal change termed as the emerging 
knowledge society. In this discourse long term growth, competitive advantages on the world market and 
employment effects are primarily perceived in high-tech sectors, which are regarded as knowledge-
intensive. According to this perspective the question as to the future of industrial sectors and companies 
that produce mature and conventional standard products is not raised at all. Such industrial sectors are 
generally regarded as "low-tech" and are deemed as being beset with more or less explicitly negative 
locational conditions. However, there are a number of convincing examples of sectors and companies 
that have been successfully manufacturing low tech products in advanced countries. And there are also 
convincing examples of industrial districts based on mature technologies which show a remarkable de-
gree of prosperity. This then is the starting point of the arguments in the paper presented: First of all, the 
widely held view that knowledge is clearly measurable will be reviewed. Then, the concept of knowledge 
will be discussed working out the specific features of the knowledge which is relevant to the low-tech 
sector. The specific knowledge base of low-tech companies will be characterized as “practical knowl-
edge”. Subsequently, the reorganization measures taken by low-tech companies in order to use and 
develop their specific knowledge will be shown. In the conclusion of this paper, the findings will be 
summarized and it will be asked for the developmental future of low-tech industries in the context of the 
ongoing societal change. 
 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Die Argumentation des Papiers bezieht sich auf die sozialwissenschaftliche Debatte über den gegen-
wärtigen gesellschaftlichen Wandel, der vielfach als die Entwicklung zu einer Wissensgesellschaft be-
zeichnet wird. In dieser Debatte werden Wachstumschancen und die Entstehung neuer Arbeitsplätze 
wie generell für Unternehmen Wettbewerbsvorteile auf dem Weltmarkt nur im High-tech Sektor gese-
hen, der auch als wissensintensiver Wirtschaftszweig betrachtet wird. Wirtschaftszweige jedoch, die 
alte, konventionelle und standardisierte Produkte herstellen, haben in dieser Perspektive in den 
entwickelten Ländern nur wenig Entwicklungschancen. Solchen auch als „Low-tech“ zu bezeichnenden 
Sektoren und Unternehmen werden in den entwickelten Ländern nurmehr sehr ungünstige Standort-
bedingungen eingeräumt. Jedoch ist unübersehbar, dass es eine ganze Reihe solcher Unternehmen 
gibt, die sehr erfolgreich in entwickelten Ländern produzieren. Zudem existieren überzeugende 
Beispiele für prosperierende Regionen, deren industrielle Basis alte und traditionelle Technologien um-
fasst. An diese Befunde knüpft die Argumentation des vorliegenden Papiers an: Erstens wird die vor-
herrschende Meinung, wonach Wissen eindeutig messbar sei, kritisch diskutiert. Zweitens wird der vor-
herrschende Wissensbegriff diskutiert und es werden die Merkmale jener Wissensform herausgear-
beitet, die als typisch für den Low-tech Sektor angesehen werden können. Dieses spezifische Wissen 
wird als „praktisches“ Wissen begriffen. Anschließend werden Reorganisationsmaßnahmen von Low-
tech Unternehmen skizziert, die auf die Mobilisierung dieses praktischen Wissens zielen. Abschließend 
werden einige Thesen zur Zukunft des Low-tech Sektors im Kontext des gegenwärtigen sozialen und 
ökonomischen Wandels formuliert. 
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Hartmut Hirsch-Kreinsen 
 
Knowledge in Societal Development: The Case of Low-Tech Industries1 
1. The emerging importance of knowledge  
Ongoing societal change in nearly all modern societies is generally seen in the context of an emerging 
“Knowledge Society” (cf. Drucker 1994; Stehr 1994; Willke 1998) or “Learning Economy” (cf. Lund-
vall/Borras 1997). These arguments suggest that modern organizations and societies are currently un-
dergoing a fundamental change process, characterized by an enhanced significance of knowledge as a 
productive force and asset. Continual innovation is seen as a decisive determinant of economic and 
social development, accompanied by a restructuring of work processes and organization, with knowl-
edge handling – knowledge generation, diffusion and utilization – becoming a core characteristic. This 
discourse on the emerging knowledge society describes - beyond any doubt - important tendencies of 
economic and social development. Following this discourse, completely new patterns of societal struc-
tures are emerging, and the economies of industrialized countries in Europe and elsewhere are at least 
going through two great changes (Carson 1998):  
· The first change is that a lot of industrial production is moving from their traditional sites to develop-
ing countries; the classic example is the exodus of textiles from the rich world over the past two 
decades. Quite soon now, many big western companies will have more employees and even cus-
tomers in developing countries than in developed ones.  
· The second change is that, in many industrialized countries, the balance of economic activity is 
swinging from manufacturing to services. Even in Germany and Japan, which rebuilt so many facto-
ries after 1945, manufacturing‘s share of jobs is now below 30 % as of the GDP. The effect of the 
shift is increased as manufacturing moves to the developing countries, whose cheap labor gives 
them a sharp advantage in many of the repetitive tasks required by mass production. 
Particularly in western countries, these trends have caused a debate about an ongoing process of 
“deindustrialization”. By the end of the 80s, a lot of American and European experts had come to believe 
that their countries’ industry was being “hollowed out” as many of its basic activities moved to other 
                                                 
1 Paper to be published in Journal for Mental Changes, Central European Institute for Behavioral Economics, 
Lublin. 
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areas (cf. Dertouzos et al. 1989). But all in all, it was not like that. A change is happening, but it is not 
simply a destructive change. Rather the industry of many countries is reorganizing itself and changing 
its structure and position in a new economic environment. The result is that many industries are not only 
still located in their former home countries, but they are also very competitive and successful on the 
world market.  
The main feature of this change process are intensified innovation activities of many companies which 
are based on the growing importance and utilization of knowledge and knowledge work. To mobilize 
knowledge and experience, companies have to introduce specific organization and innovation strate-
gies. These strategies are mainly aimed at changing their traditional organizational and personnel struc-
tures as well as their conventional style of utilizing technologies. On the level of work organization, more 
indirect forms of coordination are necessary alongside the conventional, more direct forms of bureau-
cratic and hierarchical control and coordination. This increases the importance of the employees‘ com-
mitment, motivation and initiative, especially in new forms of work organizations like group work. The 
participative use of information technologies, the greater impact of organizational culture and the in-
creased importance of inter-organizational production networks are also indicators for the change proc-
ess of industrial structures. 
Following empirical evidence, this holds even true for industrial sectors, which can be termed as “low-
tech”, producing mature and simple products like furniture, clothing or light bulbs (cf. The Economist 
1998; Maskell 1998). These facts are surprising. Since in the public discourse on the emerging knowl-
edge society there is a firm belief that the high-potential and growth sectors are to be found among the 
industrial sectors, which are, par force, engaged in innovative technologies and intensive research and 
development. In other words: “high-tech” industries hold the key to the future. And these are regarded 
as knowledge-intensive sectors whereas the so called low-tech sectors are usually regarded as little 
knowledge-based without a real future in many old industrialized countries. Only the high-tech sectors 
promise chances for development, and therefore, so the argument continues, it makes sense that the 
economic and technological policymakers should favor them.  
This argument simply overlooks that in all industrialized countries there still is a relatively large sector of 
low-tech industry, in manufacturing as well as in service sectors. This holds true for the old industrialized 
countries of Western Europe and particularly for the “following” countries of Middle and Eastern Europe 
with their basis of traditional and mature industries. An indicator of the importance of the low-tech sector 
in Europe is the well-known OECD classification of industrial sectors based on the concept of R&D in-
tensity, i. e the ratio of internal R&D to output in the industry concerned (Hatzichronoglou 1997). Indus-
tries with a ratio of R&D to gross product, or value added, of more than four percent were classified as 
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high-tech. Those between one and four percent were medium-tech, and those less than one percent 
were low-tech. The latter sector includes such activities as food processing, mechanical engineering, 
wood products, retail distribution, social and community services etc.. According to the OECD Inter-
Sectoral DataBase (OECD 1997), in the second half of the 1990s, value added in low tech industries, as 
a share of all manufacturing, ranged in Western Europe from 50 % (Sweden) to nearly 75 % (Belgium). 
Similarly, the average EU-wide employment in low-tech industries as a share of total manufacturing 
employment was 55 % in the mid-1990s. With the inclusion of a range of service sectors with little R&D 
effort, the inevitable conclusion is that European economies, are dominated by purportedly low-tech 
sectors and activities. This in fact holds true for nearly all European economies even those of Central 
Europe. A range of studies and indicators show that there is no clear-cut relationship between this low-
tech status and low innovation rates. The relative size of these sectors by itself suggests the importance 
of understanding their innovation-related dynamics. In addition, it can be claimed that present patterns 
of economic growth and structural change and the potential for future growth involve these sectors to a 
degree that goes far beyond the naïve claims of the widely used high-tech based view of economic 
growth. 
In fact, major aspects of present structural change in advanced economies happen outside the realm of 
high-tech industries. As the results of empirical studies show, these low-tech sectors have potential for 
development and for laying the foundation of growth and need – especially in terms of employment 
prospects – to be taken into consideration (cf. Laestadius 1995; The Economist 1998; 2001; Schmierl 
2000; Hirsch-Kreinsen 2000). Empirical studies prove furthermore, these are industries of high innova-
tive capability that offer prospects for rapid technological change (cf. Maskell 1998; Laestadius 1999). 
And finally, low-tech products and companies are very often a crucial precondition for the innovative-
ness of whole value chains and for the design, fabrication and application of high-tech products of vari-
ous kinds (cf. Kremer 1993; Cohen 1997). 
This then is the starting point of the following arguments: First of all, the widely held view that knowledge 
is clearly measurable will be reviewed. Then, the concept of knowledge will be discussed working out 
the specific features of the knowledge which is relevant to the low-tech sector. Subsequently, the reor-
ganization measures taken by low-tech companies in order to use and develop their specific knowledge 
will be shown. In the conclusion of this paper, the findings will be summarized and it will be asked for the 
developmental future of low-tech industries in the context of the ongoing societal change. 
The following argumentation is based, firstly, on results of an empirical research project on case studies 
in 16 low-tech companies in Germany. Their products are, for instance, simple gaskets, plug connec-
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tions, fuses, office material, corrugated paper boxes, standard kitchen furniture, and bath tubs.2 Sec-
ondly, the arguments are based on groundwork for an international research project which deals with 
the developmental chances of low-tech industries in Europe.3 
2. The black box called knowledge 
Many widely used concepts such as “high-tech” and “low-tech”, and their derivatives owe their origins to 
concepts and interpretations of economic growth that were developed during the period 1945-1960. This 
holds particularly true for the above-mentioned OECD technology indicators. In this framework, science 
and scientific knowledge are a core focus: Research and development (R&D) input as a share of some 
industrial activity measure (such as sales or value added) has, for a long time, been used as the most 
important indicator of technology levels. High-tech firms regarded as knowledge-intensive are quite 
simply those which spend a large share of their resources on R&D; low-tech firms i.e. those utilizing little 
knowledge are those which do not. Following the OECD taxonomy, the indicators define technology 
intensity as follows (cf. OECD 1997; Palmberg 2001):  
· Industries spending more than 4 % of total output on R&D are classified as high-tech; these indus-
tries include, for instance, aerospace, computer technologies and pharmaceuticals. 
· Those spending between 1 and 3,9 % are classified as medium-high-tech or medium-low-tech; 
included here are, for instance, electrical machinery, motor vehicles, mechanical engineering, ship-
building and petroleum refining. 
· The remaining industries with R&D expenditures below 1 % of total sales are categorized as low-
tech industries including, for instance, paper and printing, wood and furniture, and foodstuffs. 
This perspective is attractively simple - especially for nations and communities that wish to develop 
knowledge-based economies. However, this view has to be explored very critically. 
Firstly, major definitional, conceptual, and analytical questions have to be raised. It can be demon-
strated that the above-mentioned indicators of levels of knowledge intensity that are typically used are 
not robust, in the sense of being consistent across industries. For technology intensity indicators are, in 
fact, very partial measures of techno-economic dynamics of a sector or the system in which it partakes. 
                                                 
2 The case studies have been conducted in the years 1997 to 1999 and were funded by the German Federal Min-
istry of Education and Research (BMBF). For in-depth results of this empirical project, cf. the final report, ed. by 
Schmierl (2000). 
3 The project „Policy and Innovation in Low-tech“ (PILOT) will be promoted for three years from December 1st 
2002 by the European Commission. Eleven partners from nine European Countries will participate. The project 
is coordinated by the Chair of Industrial Sociology (hitherto: Technology and Society) University of Dortmund. 
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Particularly, their major flaws are related to the fact that they are based on rather one-sided fixation on 
R&D expenditures as the main indicator of the specific character of an industry and its innovativeness 
(cf. Palmberg 2001). As a result, they tell little about either the real knowledge intensity in a general 
sense or about growth prospects. It is further to argue that there are fundamental methodological (espe-
cially statistical) flaws, as well as flaws of logic, in high-tech growth models. The indicators can be char-
acterized as uni-dimensional, which can be regarded as being seriously misleading (cf. Laestadius 
1999).  
Secondly, the character of the specific knowledge created in low-tech industries and of its relevance for 
the innovative capabilities of individual companies, value chains and regions is overseen. This knowl-
edge can be characterized, as will be shown later, as predominantly “practical” or “application-oriented”, 
distinct from “theoretical” or “scientific” knowledge, and resembling what Michael Polanyi (1966) has 
termed “implicit knowledge” in contrast to “explicit knowledge”. Furthermore, there is a general neglect 
of other major dimensions of knowledge in economic production. The study by Wendy Faulkner (1994; 
also Faulkner/Senker 1995) illustrates this well: It is shown that knowledge used in industrial innovation 
and production processes has many different dimensions. They may not be reduced on that single indi-
cator of R&D intensity; it is rather a question of conceptualizing “knowledge” considering different di-
mensions such as: the object of the knowledge in question and the specific character of knowledge 
(Faulkner 1994: pp. 449). Only a careful analysis of these different dimensions reveals the specific 
character of industrial production and innovation processes. Moreover, a recent study on the dynamics 
and characteristics of firms’ relations to external repositories of knowledge (Hales 2001), demonstrates 
that a distinction between knowledge as furnished by external repositories or ‘knowledge bases’ and the 
productive competence underpinning firm-level innovation and behaviour is essential for understanding 
the ‘learning processes’ of innovating firms. Rather than the concept of ‘knowledge intensity’, this im-
plies that the relevant driver is ‘competence intensity’. This in itself suggests the basic limitation of high-
tech, science-driven approaches to understanding industrial processes and innovation. 
Fourthly, this raises the question whether it is possible to adequately analyze the specific features of 
innovation and production processes through a more or less isolated approach to knowledge; since that 
kind of isolated approach, if only for reasons of method and measurability, focuses the analysis on ex-
plicit or codified knowledge. The analysis of work and production structures, where knowledge is used, 
transferred and generated in its many different forms, seems much more appropriate and is the only 
way to do justice to the context-bound character of knowledge. The development of knowledge is al-
ways bound up with persons, actions and situations, i. e. generally with the context.4 This means, if you 
                                                 
4 In this sense, knowledge is to be comprehended as a socially determined phenomenon and should not be mixed 
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want to reveal the specific type and form of knowledge and its relevance to production and innovation, 
you have to focus the analysis on its connection with the action and work context in each case. Instruc-
tive examples are, for instance, investigations on automated production processes by Fritz Böhle et al. 
(1992), where the relevance of the informal side of work organization and experience-based knowledge 
involved to the efficiency of highly standardized and automated production processes is worked out in a 
convincing way. As for the investigation on the seemingly little knowledge-intensive low-tech work proc-
esses, one may come to the conclusion that only the analysis of the whole production and work process 
makes it possible to draw conclusions on the question whether - and if so - which forms of knowledge 
are really constitutive to them.  
In short, there is a definite need to reconsider the prevailing understanding of the dynamics of produc-
tion and innovation in the present epoch. This appraisal must be based on a thorough understanding of 
the dynamics of economic change as it unfolds across industries. In other words, the black box called 
knowledge has to be opened and analyzed seriously. In the following, some preliminary steps will be 
taken in this direction. 
3. Knowledge in low-tech industries 
To analyze the specific form of knowledge relevant in low-tech industries, it is, first of all, obvious that 
we have to fall back on the type of knowledge which is not covered by knowledge indicators, i. e. tacit 
knowledge. Of course, this concept is only hard to comprehend precisely; it is always being defined in 
connection with the concept of explicit knowledge, and an abundance of synonyms for it are used within 
the debate of the sociology of knowledge (cf. Ambrosini/Bowman 2001). Based on Polanyis’ epistemo-
logical perspective, tacit knowledge can be defined as follows (cf. Lam 2000: pp. 490): Firstly, explicit 
knowledge can be codified, stored and transferred whereas tacit knowledge is intuitive and unarticu-
lated. Knowledge of this type is action-oriented and has a personal quality that makes it difficult to for-
malize or communicate. Secondly, explicit knowledge can be generated through logical deduction and 
acquired by formal study. In contrast, tacit knowledge can only be acquired through practical experience 
in a specific context, i. e. learning-by-doing. Thirdly, explicit knowledge can be aggregated at a single 
location, stored in impersonal forms and utilized without the participation of the knowing subject. On the 
contrary, tacit knowledge is person- and context-bound. It has a distributive character and cannot be 
easily aggregated. Still following Polanyi, the origin of all human knowledge is based on tacit knowledge 
generated through individual intuition.  
                                                                                                                                                        
up with pure data and information (cf. Nonaka 1994: 15; Willke 1998: pp. 6). 
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If you look at this concept from the - in this case essential - work-process perspective, it becomes clear 
that tacit knowledge involves “action” and “doing”. It is not a question of “knowing that” but rather of 
“knowing how”, as already pointed out by Polanyi (1996). A number of conceptual extensions follow 
from this: Tacit knowledge is closely intertwined with the current work process. It shows a distinctly prac-
tical character, since it is acquired at work in an inductive and explorative way, i. e. through the above-
mentioned learning-by-doing. Furthermore, it is composed of technical skills and sedimented into more 
or less established work practices and rules. These work practices and rules are not necessarily person-
bound, they are rather work norms accepted collectively by the employees. They can show an overper-
sonal character and can also be explicable.  
This touches upon the collective dimension of knowledge, which - due to its cooperative character - 
must not be ignored when analyzing working processes. It always concerns knowledge which is stored 
in the rules, procedures, routines and shared norms of a working process as well as the factors which 
guide the problem-solving activities and patterns of interaction among its members.5 In this sense, the 
collective side of knowledge is rather to be found between than within individuals. It can be more or less 
than the sum of the individuals’ knowledge, depending on the mechanisms that translate individual into 
collective knowledge (cf. Lam 2000: p. 491). 
In order to be able to comprehend these connections in their entirety as for the analysis of working and 
production processes, the knowledge in question should be called practical knowledge. As mentioned 
above, it is acquired through the ongoing process, trained and transmitted on the basis of learning-by-
doing; it shows an individual and a collective dimension. Practical knowledge is, as a rule, not docu-
mented or covered officially by work instructions, operation plans and documentation rules. It mainly 
refers to the informal side of a working process6 often marked by well-going working methods as well as 
cooperational and communication patterns, which, however, are not to be found in any official organiza-
tion chart. They are accepted, carried out and controlled by the employees involved. It is based on col-
lective experience and commonly shared norms on how a working process should take an effective and 
efficient course. Just as every practitioner knows, this may result in clear differences from the officially 
and formally planned working organization, which are, nevertheless, absolutely essential as for the 
workability and innovation ability. 
                                                 
5 In this sense, the collective dimension of knowledge refers to the phenomenon which is also called “the collec-
tive mind“ of organizations (Weick/Roberts, 1991). 
6 In contrast to the formal side of an organization as the planned and officially defined rules system of an organi-
zation. It is a generally known fact that the functionability of an organization is based on the interplay of both the 
formal and the informal side (cf. Mayntz 1966). 
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However, practical knowledge can be recorded - unofficially - in personal documents and notes. A good 
example of it is the “black book” in a foreman’s trouser pocket where he writes down the experience 
gained when coping with everyday production problems in order to fall back on it whenever it might be 
necessary. Another widely known example are the operators of computer-controlled machine tools who 
operate machines by means of unofficial programs which are often unofficially modified. This modifica-
tion of the programs allows a fine tuning of the operations so that the production process might be much 
more efficient than if it was run with the official programs. 
Practical knowledge is also marked by the fact that it cannot be clearly separated from explicit and theo-
retical knowledge. A number of studies on the course of innovation processes in companies have 
shown7 that practical knowledge is always marked by double openness: On the one hand, its bearers 
seem to be able to adapt and to use knowledge acquired scientifically and systematically in order to 
cope with specific work problems. Practical knowledge is often the precondition for systematic work 
rules or engineering and technological findings, prototypes and other products. In other words, practical 
knowledge is in reality closely connected with theoretical knowledge. In this sense, practical knowledge 
shows high dynamics and potential for development with its bearers proving to be very capable of learn-
ing. Thus, the above-mentioned modification of NC programs is just based on the competent and ex-
perience-based adaptation of given codified knowledge in the form of the programs developed in the 
programming department and the logical and syntactic rules of a programming language. Another in-
structive example, described by Laestadius (1995), is the absorption of external R&D results in a com-
pany producing anchor cables. It concerns the adjustment of given material parameters to the actual 
requirements of a forging process whose course is hard to calculate. Obviously, it requires a high de-
gree of practical experience, which the employees are provided with. A third example of this phenome-
non are working processes of engineers in construction and development departments. They are ever 
since especially based on the engineer’s skill, i. e. his experience and “instinctive” feeling, enabling him 
to apply his systematically and scientifically acquired knowledge to the relevant problem and to imple-
ment it in order to find solutions (cf. Wengenroth 1999).  
On the other hand, however, empirical knowledge can also pass into officially codified knowledge by 
being recorded in technical documentation and databases. So, the content of the foreman’s “black book” 
can turn into official work instructions and documentation; the operator informs the plannning depart-
ment about the modifications - which is already common practice in many companies - where they are 
added to the next official program for the computerized machine tools and stored in the database for 
                                                 
7 This has been instructively proven by investigation results of very different social-science disciplines such as 
innovation economics (cf. Nelson/Winter 1982; Faulkner/Senker 1995), sociology of technology (cf. Asdonk et 
al. 1991) and sociology of knowledge (Nonaka 1994; Nonaka/Takeuchi 1995;Willke 1998).  
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these programs. In other words, these are processes of knowledge conversion between practical and 
theoretical knowledge. These conversion procsses can be considered as a central prerequisite for inno-
vations, since in this way new knowledge is created. Nevertheless, these processes are not unproblem-
atic, as already shown in particular by Nonaka (1994)8, and a number of requirements have to be met. 
Thus, new knowledge can only be generated on condition that the transitions between the many differ-
ent types of knowledge are made to last and kept free of disturbance. 
If we apply these considerations to the specific features of low-tech production, we can start from the 
assumption that in this industrial sector there will predominate a type of knowledge which comes very 
close to the outlined features of practical knowledge in a special way. According to Laestadius (1995; 
1998), this kind of knowledge proves particularly successful for solutions to technical everyday problems 
and for intelligent variations of well-known problems, e. g:  
· the ability to handle daily specific product materials such as developing and processing specific 
steel alloys in order to prolong the life-cycle of, for instance, machines used in agriculture; 
· the know-how and the experience needed to guarantee the smooth running and the improvement of 
complex production plants used in the manufacturing of gaskets and fuses; 
· the mastering of processes and logistics in order to improve the processing flexibility and the market 
position, aspects that play a prominent role in the making and distribution of kitchen furniture; 
· the competence for a customer-specific interpretation of mature products such as anchor cables on 
the basis of often incomplete information and specification, and for adjusting it, at the same time, 
with flexibility to the required technical procedures. 
In other words: what characterizes the production processes of the low-tech sector is its reliance on 
knowledge that is created and reproduced through learning-by-doing, empirical trial-and-error, and lim-
ited systematic training. Its essence is an intuitively accumulated type of know-how. Experience is gath-
ered while dealing with the material reality of the product and the manufacturing processes. The knowl-
edge of the trade has not primarily been acquired in a theoretical or cognitive way, but may be identified 
as know-how of a markedly intuitive quality and closely tied to the human resources. It is each individual 
working for the company that possesses competence, which is only partially available and visible to the 
outsider in the form of organizational guidelines, objectified information such as technical norms and 
standards, written directives, documentation material, and databases.  
                                                 
8 See also in detail Nonaka/Takeuchi (1995). 
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4. The mobilization of practical knowledge low-tech companies 
Asking how low-tech companies mobilize their specific practical knowledge, a broad spectrum of reor-
ganization and innovation strategies can be found in the German companies where case studies have 
been conducted (cf. Schmierl 2000). They range from a far-reaching technical-organizational restructur-
ing of the entire production process to partial and gradual steps of reorganizing certain functions. Fun-
damentally, the organization must make it possible to continuously make use of the practical knowledge 
available and to permanently develop and adjust it in response to new requirements. For low-tech com-
panies, this means breaking with the “Tayloristic” structures they had grown fond of, characterized by a 
strictly-defined division of labor, highly repetitive tasks and the use of mostly semiskilled or even un-
skilled workers. For it was exactly those structures which convinced workers to hide their knowledge of 
the trade or to use it for little innovations only unofficially in order to gain more freedom. Therefore, it 
seems essential that reorganization measures aim at removing blockades by redefining job profiles, 
cooperation and process structures. All in all, there have been efforts in the companies investigated to 
create organizational forms in order to remove this blockade allowing much more than before an effec-
tive mobilization of existent knowledge and its continuous development. 
According to the existing literature, this basically requires organizational structures enabling intensive 
interaction and communication between the employees involved and, consequently, a continuous ex-
change of knowledge as well as collective learning processes. Cross-functional and self-organizing 
teams, which show a high degree of functional redundancy and low specification of the employees (cf. 
Aoki 1988; Nonaka 1994; Leonard-Barton 1995; Nonaka/Takeuchi 1995), are considered to be one 
central element of such organizational forms. The argument is that cross-functional teams integrate and 
synthesize knowledge across different areas of expertise serving as a bridge between the individual and 
the organization. It is at the team level at the intersection between horizontal and vertical flows of 
knowledge, where the greatest of interaction, learning and knowledge diffusion can take place (Lam 
2000: 498). Of course, a lot of additional organizational conditions are necessary, if knowledge mobiliza-
tion is to work properly. What is pointed out in particular is the successful and consistent integration of 
the teams into organizational basic structures, ensuring orientation and stability, and the existence of a 
company culture conducive to knowledge. 
As the results of the case studies show the reorganization measures of the companies aim at the essen-
tials of such knowledge-conducive organizational forms. In most cases, this means, of course, a far-
reaching break with present "Tayloristic" structures so that the reorganization process often turns out to 
be long, laborious and risky. 
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4.1 Teamwork and Qualifying Measures 
The main approach towards mobilizing practical knowledge and experience is that of reorganizing tasks 
and qualifying the staff. Such measures play a central role in the spectrum of reorganization strategies 
of almost all companies investigated. They aim at enabling staff to develop autonomous competence for 
rationalization and innovation and to react flexibly to changing market situations. Companies pursue this 
objective by a variety of means which result in qualitative promotion, an increase in autonomy, and the 
improvement of human resources motivation. All measures taken are based on human resource-
oriented management concepts, well known since the Lean Production debate in the early 90s: the 
measures, moreover, are tailor-cut to meet the specific needs of low-tech producers.  
In the companies, one finds, respectively, various forms of teamwork as the central means of reorgani-
zation which ultimately leads to the staff’s active participation in a continuous process of rationalization. 
The spectrum of measures taken is broad: They may take the form of an implementation of teams su-
pervising the production process, such as the setting up of quality assurance groups. They may also be 
far-reaching, such as structural changes of task or process organization through separating planning 
and operational tasks in teams that are given a high level of autonomy in planning.  
One example of teams supervising the production process is that of a company making gaskets; it is 
influenced by the principles of the Japanese Kaizen. The measure runs by the name of „Growtth“ (i.e. 
„get rid of waste through team harmony“). Within a period of time, the teams that are formed to work on 
specific rationalization problems and projects. In turn, the management defines the compass and the 
concrete objectives of each Growtth-project. The team fulfills the task within three or four days, and the 
improvements suggested are realized immediately. The team members belong to all levels of the com-
pany hierarchy; customer representatives or distributors may be included in the team as well. How the 
solution is found, how change is brought about and implemented is left to the team members. On the 
one hand, this measure aims at mobilizing the practical knowledge of the staff involved by establishing 
open and self organized group situations. On the other hand, this situation is regarded as a precondition 
to induce learn processes and to improve the knowledge of the staff. 
However, the introduction of teamwork creates the desired effects on mobilization of knowledge only if it 
is accompanied and supported by an appropriate framework, the other reorganizational measure whose 
importance is often overlooked. This means, first, that a business turns to systematically rewarding and 
thus to remunerating the performance of the team as a collective and its results rather than the individ-
ual. Second, a number of businesses have been moving away from inflexible working hours, as, for 
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instance, set shifts and the concept of overtime. What is used instead is a time corridor which regulates 
the working hours according to the order position. Third, objectives can be reached by the introduction 
of teamwork only if the personnel is systematically enabled to use the potential of the new group struc-
tures. This requires professional development via qualifying measures. 
In addition, the companies showed attempts at combining the outlined work-organizational adjustments 
with a change of management roles and managerial style ensuring hierarchically the transfer of compe-
tence to the workshop. But, given the volatile nature of this issue in terms of company policy, it is hard to 
say on the basis of the case studies to what extent such changes are really effective and being pursued. 
At least, however, you can often hear from the management representatives those formulas for neces-
sary changes, such as “coaching” or “the manager as service provider to the team”, which are 
characterizing current management debates. But if these formulas are not accompanied by real 
changes, conflicts and counterproductive effects cannot be excluded. In one of the companies 
investigated, some older foremen had to be transferred from production, since they were not willing to 
accept the working teams’ increase in competence. Their “overnight”-replacement was necessary to 
avoid conflicts. 
One exemplary company which introduced teams effecting structural change and which took into ac-
count all the above-mentioned aspects is that of a supplier to the automotive industry that mass-
produces highly standardized plastic parts. The company established several teams each of which is in 
charge of the full production cycle of one of two products. The teams possesses all the resources re-
quired; in turn, the teams bear full responsibility for cost effectiveness, time completion and customer 
satisfaction. Tasks concerning organization and discipline are carried out by elected team coordinators. 
What complements this work organization is a wage system designed for the collective team processes: 
each member of a team receives the same basic salary on top of which the team is paid an incentive 
bonus dependent on quality and productivity. This bonus system aims at each team’s ambition to be 
cost-effective through continuous rationalization procedures. 50 % of the costs reduced are distributed 
among the team members as monthly premiums. In principle, the system allows „negative premiums“ as 
well. An increase in costs that can be attributed to one team leads to wage reduction for each team 
member.  
Working hours are flexible from Sunday evening to Saturday evening; there are no fixed core hours. Up 
to 100 hours can be „collected and saved“. A week’s work load may range from 18 to 48 hours; the con-
cept of overtime no longer exists. Even though this means there is no compensation for overtime or 
weekends, the staff receive a guaranteed monthly salary. In addition, the works council negotiated a 
company agreement which guarantees safe employment for a four-year period. At the time the case 
study was undertaken, this agreement was intended to be renewed each year. 
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According to the statements of company managers, the change of the working structures and the acti-
vating process of the knowledge of the staff have been leading to considerable rationalization and inno-
vation. Although they cannot always be quantified or separated from the effects of other measures taken 
at the same time, the interviewees often mentioned that performance, quality and flexibility improved 
visibly. In one of the companies, in which conductor sheets were produced, the effects on the output 
could be quantified: Within a period of three years, the rate of defective products could be cut by 50 %, 
the production time by more than 75 %. Those results are remarkable, last but not least, because this 
was in an area of low-tech production including manual assembly; its workers were for the greater part 
unskilled women who are traditionally not considered to hold great potential for innovation. 
4.2 Continuous Innovation of Production Processes 
The technical and organizational modernization of production processes in their entirety makes for an-
other essential cluster of measures taken in the course of reorganization strategies. It consists, for in-
stance, of gradually changing of the process organization; and it is turning away from traditionally func-
tional organization structures in favor of a production- and process-oriented form of organization, of 
standardizing and adjusting the spectrum of products, in order to simplify the production cycle. In almost 
all of the companies investigated, it was not thought possible to successfully restructure the organization 
of the processes and the production cycle without mobilizing the employees‘ knowledge and experience. 
Thus, the management of a maker of kitchen furniture declares that the professional development of 
staff is the key to the rationalization aimed at by simplifying products and optimizing material flow. In 
turn, they have got the chance to learn and to improve their practical knowledge by running the process. 
This can clearly be seen, if one looks at the example of a switch-box manufacturer. Here the hitherto 
functional organization of production processes was replaced by a process-oriented form of production 
classified by type of order and product clusters. At the basis of this structure, there are newly-defined 
segments of the production process. Thereby the management intends to realize flexible production 
cycles that can adjust to variable demand. However, the reorganization of the processes alone turned 
out to not suffice in reaching this aim. Changing the work organization was just as essential. In contrast 
to the past situation, each group working on an individual segment was given relatively free play in 
planning by reintegrating planning and execution. First and foremost this meant that scheduling was 
decentralized, in order to put the managerial and executive responsibility for an order into „one hand“. 
Besides, the company set up teams in charge of problem-solving and continuous optimization within 
their areas. The employee-centered approach resulted in frequently changed and reorganized produc-
tion cycles. They were modified, to a high degree independently, by the workers themselves and so 
adjusted to meet the demands of flexible process organization.  
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Apart from the changes in process organization, one can detect reorganizational measures aiming at 
the improvement of communication processes. According to the case-study findings, continuous flow of 
communication is considered to be of utmost importance. It ensures that the particular interest of indi-
vidual departments which, true to Taylorism, used to be screened off from each other no longer domi-
nate. Interdepartmental objectives may be developed and communicated and operations be stream-
lined. Reorganizing the flow of communication within the business ultimately aims at improving coopera-
tion between different units, departments and so between different types of practical as well as theoreti-
cal knowledge. What this implies in organizational terms, is that departments separated from each other 
on purely functional grounds are at least partially unified. The above-mentioned introduction of a proc-
ess-oriented production structure is a classic example. Another example may be described as the at-
tempt at creating closer links between the development and the manufacture of a product. Some busi-
nesses, for instance, temporarily set up problem-solving teams from different departments, e.g. from 
Construction, Quality Assurance and Shop Floor. 
In several companies investigated, the close collaboration between different departments is part of an 
overall strategy to keep all central production units in-house. This, of course, is diametrically opposed to 
popular management concepts in favor of reducing the product and production range and focusing the 
company on its so called core competencies. According to the management representatives inter-
viewed, it is the greatest possible control over the means for the creation of value by which know-how 
and experience can be kept and developed. So, a maker of kitchen furniture follows an „everything-at-
one-site“ strategy. This led him to keep a wide product and production range and to reintegrate previ-
ously outsourced production units and other departments, such as saw-cutting and treatment of furniture 
fronts. The management of another business – a manufacturer of simple fuses – subject their decisions 
concerning relocation and outsourcing to the objective of securing the competence of the business, thus 
creating the conditions for expansion. This implies that the most important engineering and production 
units stay within the company and are closely linked to the marketing department. Only those compo-
nents that must be adapted to meet the demands of different local markets are produced in the respec-
tive countries abroad. As the technical director explains, it is by this strategy of concentrating central 
functions for the creation of value at one site that the company remains competitive also when con-
fronted by low-cost competitors from low-wage countries. This strategy allows the company to react 
flexibly, to keep high quality standards and to be extremely innovative in further developing their prod-
ucts.  
Considering the often incalculable market and competence conditions, there are, of course, hardly to be 
seen any real “final states” of company organization and process structure in the companies. These 
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activities - just as the management’s view involved - are rather to be considered as an ongoing process, 
which has to make allowances for the turbulent and hardly calculable external conditions. It is consid-
ered to be successful, if, on the one hand, it increases the internal continuity, stability and reliability of 
the processes and, on the other hand, enables a distinct and flexible orientation towards the market and 
the customer. In other words: A flexible organization capable of seizing new sales opportunities, and, at 
the same time, capable of being in control of the resulting continuously growing complexity is to be im-
plemented. According to the findings, this target is a difficult challenge, especially for low-tech produc-
ers, since they have to open their highly standardized and, in some cases, even deeply ingrained struc-
tures in order to activate hidden knowledge which may be going to waste. 
4.3 Increased importance of external cooperation  
The reorganization strategies of the companies are no longer concerned with internal affairs only. Simi-
lar to those of other branches of industry, they look to external production and market relations. Estab-
lishing relations with other companies, organizations and institutions is an activity even low-tech indus-
tries cannot do without anymore. It helps in overcoming the limitations of one’s own resources and 
know-how and in developing new and progressive production and innovation potential.  
As is the case with a number of branches of industry, vertical cooperation with suppliers and distributors 
has also been gaining in importance for low-tech manufacturers. Relatively loose and order-dependent 
connections have been extended and intensified in order to optimize the time for delivery, to reduce 
storage costs, and, first and foremost, to test and probe the potential for the development of the product 
mix. The already mentioned maker of kitchen furniture even talked about „a strategic alliance“ which he 
was to enter into with selected distributors for the joint development of product components. In order to 
make cooperation easier, his business is setting up relations with suppliers in the region whereas rela-
tions with distributors from abroad are broken off. The basic reason for this measures is to widen the 
knowledge base of the company by implementing a continuous flow of information and knowledge to 
and from the suppliers. This knowledge flow is particularly supported by interaction mechanisms based 
on the regional proximity of the partners involved. 
Relations between the company and its customers are reshaped as well. It becomes increasingly impor-
tant to cooperate with select customers. This stabilizes customer relations, and integrates customer 
needs and interests into the product development and design. Following this trend that can be observed 
in many branches of industry and that has been termed „production on demand“ or „mass customiza-
tion“ (cf. Rautenstrauch et al. 2002), it seems to be an opportunity for manufacturers of low-tech prod-
ucts as well. It enables them to take innovative measures in a clearly defined, and goal-oriented way, to 
escape some pressure of competition, and to develop new market potential. The manufacturers of low-
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tech products thus reshape their relations with customers by interlocking communication and adjustment 
processes.  
The producer of gaskets, for instance, makes customers members of his „Growtth teams“, at times, as I 
mentioned earlier in this paper. By this, he seeks to solve problems of quality assurance and delivery 
time. Another approach includes the producer’s intention to change the traditional practices in distribu-
tion and internal communication by creating a new space for customer interference and feedback. He 
strives for cross-border and inter-organizational cooperation which, to quote the management, is to „en-
able a customer relationship that is based on partnership“. Both partners are to exchange know-how 
and service. In order to underline the importance of this form of cooperation, the companies interviewed 
frequently talk of „systemic partnership“. Even those manufacturers of low-tech products at the end of 
the production chain producing goods for an anonymous market, attempt to collect information on the 
profiles of their customers and to establish market relations with them. The manufacturer of fuses who 
used to cater for retail is a classic example. In order to learn more about market conditions and cus-
tomer interests, he has been trying to avoid the retailers, such as wholesalers of building materials; 
instead, he has been seeking business relations with the customers directly, in his case, crafts- and 
handymen. By this, the management hopes to gather information on the practicability of the products 
and thus ideas for their further development.  
Examples of horizontal cooperation with direct or indirect competitors were rare in Germany, however. 
Interviews with the management showed that such strategies were not excluded in theory. They too 
were considered to be an option by which to open the product spectrum and to join forces in marketing 
activities in order to face competitors. Yet, attempts at cooperation existed only with manufacturers of 
like products and product components. The producer of faucets included in this study is a case in point. 
Together with another manufacturers, he pushed the development of a completely new product which is 
being marketed jointly in North-America. Wider, closer and long-lasting cooperations with competitors 
like those documented in literature on the “Third Italy”, well-known in industrial and regional economics, 
or the furniture industry in Flanders (cf. Pyke/Sengeberger 1992; Maskell 1998), could not be found in 
the companies investigated.9 
It should be noted, however, that horizontal cooperation is of a very delicate nature. Latent fear of losing 
know-how to potential competitors exists at the management level of many businesses and proves to be 
a great obstacle to cooperation. As long as companies cannot rule out the possibility of threatening 
situations to arise they tend to do without cooperative business relations to other companies. Besides, 
                                                 
9 This, of course, refers to a specific German feature, since not only the present findings have shown that strong 
horizontal cooperations are relatively rare in German industry (cf. Hellmer et al. 1999; Reindl 1999). 
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sales interest of each of the partners cooperating determine how close such ties may be. Or, in the 
words of a manager: „When it comes to wooing customers it is each man for himself.“ 
5. The future of low-tech sectors  
To summarize the arguments: It appears that the intelligent and successful production of low-tech prod-
ucts presupposes a specific practical knowledge available to the respective company. Its basis are the 
skills, experiences and the know-how of those employed in the company which is generated and con-
tinuously reproduced in the work process. This result corresponds with the recent revival of the debate 
in the social sciences, dealing with the growing importance of knowledge-intensive work and the need 
for organizations to learn and to develop know-how. These aspects are generally regarded as 
characteristics of an emerging knowledge-oriented society. As already stressed at the beginning, these 
arguments describe unpredictable tendencies of social development. The described reorganization 
measures of the low-tech companies without any doubt fit this perspective. Not only do they make 
intensive use of the knowledge available to them; they also develop it and restructure their organization 
accordingly. 
This means that knowledge and knowledge-based innovation strategies cannot be regarded as features 
of expanding and new sectors, such as professionalized services and software production. Without a 
doubt, these sectors must be regarded as markedly knowledge-based, since they are immediately de-
pendent on the use of explicit knowledge. As the findings presented here show, phenomena relevant to 
the debate may also be found when one studies other types of knowledge in industrial core industries – 
industries that from the point of view of an emerging knowledge-based society are outdated and little 
future-oriented. Those sectors are not marked by gradual erosion. Instead, they will reposition them-
selves in the context of socio-economic change. In spite of globalization and growing competition, pros-
pects are good especially on the markets for mature products. The reason is the specific practical 
knowledge low-tech companies are provided with, which, in many cases, can hardly be used by poten-
tial competitors. For this knowledge, as mentioned above, can be deeply embedded in the social system 
of a company and its local environment, which makes it hardly transferable and accessible to competi-
tors for the production of similar products; since it would require a reconstruction of the unique amalga-
mation of the company-specific know-how, the skills of the employed, informal organization structures 
and probably its regionalized capabilities (cf. Maskell 1998). Obviously, this applies - paradoxically - to 
standardized products which can considered to be easy to imitate. 
These arguments lead to a specific understanding of the restructuring of the economic landscape of 
Europe at the beginning of the 21st century. This change does not appear as a wholesale structural 
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replacement of “old” sectors with “new” ones, or as substitution of “old” technologies with “new” ones. It 
evolves as a restructuring of sectoral and technological systems, transformed more from within than 
from without. This change process is not dominated by industrial activities where competitive advan-
tage, capability formation and economic change are constituted by frontline technological knowledge. 
Rather, it is dominated by what are often wrongly termed low- and medium-tech industries. There are 
many who argue that, since high-tech industries and "knowledge-intensive" industries are one and the 
same, the economic health of Europe depends simply on the capacity to create and nurture so-called 
"high-technology" industries. These industries, particularly the information technology and telecommuni-
cations (ICT) cluster, are regarded as the bearers of growth, employment and trade success in the fu-
ture. The policy conclusion tends to be that innovation policy, technology policy and, indeed, economic 
policy more generally ought to be focussed primarily on the creation of ICT industries. 
Following the above outlined findings, it can be supposed that this type of analysis, and the analytical 
and policy conclusions that result, are deeply flawed. The concepts and categories used to describe 
allegedly high-tech, knowledge-intensive industries are seriously oversimplified, lacking empirical sup-
port, and conceptually naive. Rather, it can be emphasized that: 
· The innovation systems of Europe and indeed of most industrialized countries are strongly influ-
enced by low-tech industries. 
· The knowledge bases of these industries are deep, complex and systemic. They use engineering 
and scientific knowledge and are closely integrated with the science and technology infrastructure. 
The mere fact that they do not do much internal R&D says nothing at all about knowledge intensity 
or their contribution to the knowledge economy. 
· They are very often embedded in specific regional structures and are part of regional company net-
works that differ from country to country and are part of specific national and regional innovation 
systems.  
Furthermore, the involvement of low-tech products and companies is frequently a core precondition both 
for the innovativeness of value chains - or production systems - and for the design, fabrication and use 
of a range of high-tech products. Collaboration and networking between companies of different indus-
tries at regional, national, as well as trans-national levels, are increasingly becoming important determi-
nants of the innovativeness and competitiveness of individual companies. These value chains, filières or 
clusters include low-tech companies not just as tiered participants in supply chains or as more-or-less 
passive receptors of technologically advanced machinery and equipment developed independently of 
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user specifities. In addition, the dynamics and efficiency of value chains may be crucially dependent on 
the reliability and effectiveness, the capabilities and specific knowledge of their low-tech partners and on 
their integration into innovation processes in other firms in the cluster, whether low-tech or high-tech. It 
has to be emphasized that the focus on low-tech firms as parts of wider value chains implies an imme-
diate inclusion of service functions, whether supplied by independently organized service firms, as sec-
ondary industrial activities of other firms or through intra-firm production of ancillary services.  
This focus on the contribution of low-tech industries for the innovativeness for industry in general is ex-
tremely important in a political perspective, both for the potential of effectively formulating national and 
regional innovation policies and for developing a proper foundation for the identification of the overall 
growth and performance possibilities of the European economy. The development of the low-tech sec-
tors is of great importance for both ‘old’ industrialized and more recent ‘high-tech’ economic countries 
and regions. Following the arguments above, the high-tech perspective of many economies is based on 
the presence and dynamic interaction of reliable ‘low-tech’ functions and processes. This holds particu-
larly true for value chains which have an increasingly transnational, and global, character and can be 
regarded as one of the driving forces of the economic development. This aspect is of outstanding impor-
tance for the future development of the Central European countries, since many low-tech processes are 
located there and they are more and more isntegrated into the internationalized value chains. But also in 
a general perspective, their development is largely based on the competitive and innovative capabilities 
of low-tech industries.  
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